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THE SUPPLYING ]UDG EMENT IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
By ]UNKICHI MATSUSHIMA 
Lectu問 rof La叩，Osaka University 
From the view point of our existing law can the law suit (supplying 
judgement) asking for commission or omission against the 0節目 ofAdmi-
nistration be generally admitted? 
(1) 
The matter as to whether or not the law suit (supplying judgement) 
asking for commission or omission against the office of administration 
is admitted is different among nations and countries， and thus there are 
nations which acknowledge it generally， and there are nations that 
acknowledge it partly， and there are even nations that do not acknowle-
dge it completely any more. 
Even though we make a survey of main nations that bear attitude 
of judicial nation， in which the judicial courts have jurisdictional right 
as to the administrative matters， there is institution of‘Mandamus' in 
England and in America， and in West Germany 'U ntatigkeitsklage' is 
admitted， and in Italy only the judgement commanding payment of a 
definite amount of to the office of administration is admitted. Well， 
what matter is done in ]apan? In ]apan hitherto， ]apan has made a 
model of examples of European nations and the socalled_ administrative 
courts， that were independent of the judicial courts， were established so 
as to make practice of judgement as to administrative matters and thus 
as a rule the judgements as to the administrative laws were executed 
by these judicial courts. However now the constitution of ]apan is 
executed and thus the following matters are prescribed in Article 76 
in it:‘The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in 
such inferior courts as are established by law. No extraordinary tribunal 
shall be established， nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be 
THE SUPpLYING }UDGEMENT IN THE 
ADMINISTRA TIVE PROCEDURE 
35 
given fina:l judica:l power. Moreover (Artic1e 3 inthe Court Laws) pres-
cribes c1ear1y just as following， admitting the above-mentioned statement， 
“besides the case ofspecial prescription in the constitution of Japan 
the law-courts of judicial law-suits and can have powers prescribed 
especially in the laws. The prescription of the above mentioned artic1e 
does not hinder the administrative organizations from judging as the 
previous judgements." The result was that the administrative law“courts 
hitherto were abolished and the jurisdiction of the judicial courts (or-
dinary courts) came to extend to the administrative matters that had 
been dealt by the administrative law-courts before.ω 
As to the point to what degree indeed the judicial law-courts can 
examine the administrative and give judgements to them， however， 
(1) Through the establishment and the execution of the }apanese Constitution， there 
are many objections as to the view point that the pow巴rof judgement for th巴 judicial
matters was entrusted to the judicial law-courts 
For example， Dr. Minobe (the late professor of Tokyo University) says as to Item 1 
of Article 76 of the Constitution of }apan just like following; The whole judical power 
is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law. 
There is no special prescription as to what the so勾calledjudicial power means. However， 
it is not only used in the Old }apanese Imperial Constitution but also is admitted widely 
as the idea corresponded in the constitutions of other nations. Thus it is natural that 
we should acknowledge it to have been applied generaly as the widely-used meaning to 
the New }apanese Constitution. (General Introduction of the }apanese Constitution， p.449) 
By this reason there is a strong objection against the ordinary theory that the so 
called judicial power in the }apanese Constitution means the power of judgement as to 
the all of the judicial low-suits including the administrative judgement， so it is emphsized 
that “it should be interpreted the same meaning as in th巴 judicialpow巴rof the Old 
}apanese Imperial Constitution (Article 57)， i.e. m巴aningonly the judgement of the civil 
affairs and of the criminal affairs. ' (The Basical Principle of the New }apanese Cons-
titution， p.166) And from such a view point of situatian， itis concluded that it is not 
based upon the need of necessity ofthe constitution for the judicial power to make 
judgements of the administrative matters， but the judicial power is nothing but呂cknow-
ledged by the prescriptions (Article 3， law of the judicial law-court) as the special one 
of the laws. (See p. 123， Num. 8， The Study of the Pub1ic Law r邑latedwith the }udicial 
Power and the Administrative Pow釘， Prof. YANASE)ー
However， on on巴 hand，as to the security of the fundamental personal right of the 
}apanese， the }apanese Constitution makes the unusually specified and elaborated prescri-
ptions in comparison tothose of the Old }apanese Imperial Constitution (Article 94 and 
from Article 11-Article 40)， on the other it does not make such prescriptions as Article 
61 of the Old }apanese Constitution， in which it was prescribed that as to the law-suits 
of having been injured rights by the disposition of the transaction of the administrative 
office， what-if belonged to the judgements of the aministrative law-courts prescribed by 
the special laws does not have limitations of the judicial law-courts. Conversely， from 
the stand-point of the following prescriptions of Article 76， i. e. The whole judicial power 
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artic1e 1 inthe Special Case Law of the procedure for the administra-
tive matters， which is a special law as to the administrative matters， 
prescribes only like this: “as for as for the law-suits related to alte-
ration or cancellation of the i1legal disposals of the 0自ceof administra-
tion and as for the law引lItsrelated to the c1aim affairs of the other 
public laws， they are to be dependent upon what the civil procedure 
laws prescribe， besides their dependence upon this law." Thus there is 
not my concrete and c1ear prescription of this matter only except the 
above mentioned statement. Therefore， naturally through interpretation 
of these prescriptions it was needed for the accademic theory or the 
judicial precedents to establish dimension of power of judgement as to 
the administrative cases by the judicial law-courts and concretely there 
came to be proposed and raised upa problem whether or not the supp-
lying judgement can be admitted against the administrative law-suite 
froin the view point of the existing law， too. 
Thus， even in ]apan this problem came to be seriously argued 
gradual1y in this way through the theory and the judicial precedents. 
However， to my regret， the time has not so long passed since this 
problem was undertaken to study， and moreover it can be said that 
there are many controversialists who recognize this problem negatively 
at least as to the administrative law-suits of complaint， even though 
is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are estab!ished by law nor 
extraordinary tubanal shal1 be estab!ished nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive 
be given final judical power， Article 81， i.e. The Supreme Court is the court of last 
resort with power to determine of any law， order， regulation or 0鐙cialact of Article 98， 
i. e. This constitution shal1 be the supreme Iaw of the nation and no law， ordinance 
imperial rescript or other act of government， or part there of， contrary to the provis‘ 
ions hereof， shal1 have legal force or va!idity， the socalled judicial power of the Constitu-
tion of Japan as it is claimed as the ordinary view-point of the theory， isdifferent from 
what the Old Japanese Imperial Imperial Constitution included it only in the judgements of 
the civil or criminal affairs， but it means widely what the nation proclaims the laws as 
to the concrete facts， maintaining them. Thus it should be interpreted that the judge-
ments of the civil or administrative affairs also are included in it. (On this point， if
needed the detailed argument， see p. 156， Legal Theory of the Administrative Procedure 
both by Prof. TANAKA and by Prof. MINOBE) 
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except that of the person concerned，∞ and that there not so few who 
have objections against this problem. Thus the actual situation is that 
we have not reached any unified conc1usion yet. By this reason， 1 here 
introduce how this problem in our country is dea1t with in this treatise， 
and .Ishould like to say my conc1usion as to this point a1together. 
(II) 
While， as 1 have already mentioned， in our country there are many 
who intrepret this problem negatively， and thus such a kind of view司
point is todays becoming prevalent gradually， 1 should like to make a 
survey of it from this negative view-point. 
The grounds of the argument of the disputants who hold that， so 
long as there is no special prescription of laws as to the defending 
administrative law-suits in our tresent laws， the supplying judgement 
can't be acknowledged principally， are considerably various and thus 
they are not always uniform， however 1 should like to think that it is 
possible for us to integrate them to the following points if summed up 
very broadly: 
(1) lt is transgression to the principle of the principle of the indepen-
dence of powers established by the Constitution of Japan to acknowledge 
the supplying judgements as to the defending administrative law-suits. 
(2) Our laws in force generally do not acknowledge the socalled supp-
lying c1aim asking for the definite commission or omission to the admi-
(2) The administrative law-suits today， generall， divided in the big two parts， i.e. 
the defending administrative law-suits seeking for alteration or cancellation of th巴 unla崎
wful dispositions of the administrative 0伍ce，and the person-concerned administrative 
law-suits as those related to the claim relaiions in the public laws except the abovemen-
tioned ones. However the latter i. e. the person.concerned administrative law-suits has 
character like the first judging law-suit and has never charact邑rof the law-suits of retrial， 
and thus it is widely acknowledged that the so-called supplying judgements are applied 
to this kind of the law-suits. (See p. 222， The Legal Theory of the Administrative Pro-
cedure， by Prof. TANAKA) 
Therefore， ifthe matter of the supplying judgement as to the administrative law-suits 
is said to become problem whether or not it is acknowledged， itis thoroughly limited 
within the defending administrative law-suits. Thus 1 would like only to name it “the 
administrative law鴫suits"without my saying “the defending administrative law-suits" 
especially in the following chapter. 
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nistrative 0日ce.
(3) Since generally主hereis no institution of the law similar to the 
“Mandamus" prevailing in America and England and other European 
countries， itis reasonable to interpret that， solong as there is no special 
prescription of law， the law-suits asking for the commission or the omi蜘
ssion to the administrative 0伍cecan't be admitted. 
These points being taken up， 1 intend to make consideration of each 
of these relatively. 
[ 1 JFirst， what many disputants standing on the side of the negative 
view泊pointsmake grounds of is related to (1) above-mentioned， i.e. it is 
transgression to the principle of the independence of powers established 
by the }apanese Constitution to acknowledge the supplying judgements 
as to the defending administrative law-suits. 1 here intend to survey 
of what the disputants standing upon this kind of situation insist upon 
especially through some of the main judicial precedents and of the 
main academic theories. 
Prof. }IRO T ANAKA states like the following: “The }apanese 
Constitution maintains the principle of independence of the three powers， 
limitating the example of the modern constitutional nations. Namely it 
is established that the power of legislation lies in the diet and the 
power of administration in the cabinet and the power of jurisdiction in 
the law-court， and thus it should be the foundamental basis that these 
three powers respect one another.…… Therefore the judicial law-court 
is opposite to the power of administration and it must respect the unique 
judgement of the administrative power as to the administrations， playing 
functions of securing laws， i.e. it secures the application of the laws， as 
a rule， negatively in case that the administrations are performed in a 
form of transgression to the laws. 
From this view-point， on the one hand， the function of securing the 
application of the laws to the concrete facts， to speak substantially， 
c1aims this to belong to the power of the law-courts， and， on the other 
hand， the function that transgresses the limitation it's securing the laws 
does not belong to the powers of the law-courts except in such a case 
as is especially prescribed clearly as the powers of the law-courts.' 
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Prof. TANAKA continues to say like the following from that stand-
point: 
“The administrative law-courts in the Old ]apanese Imperial ConsおS咽
t出i社t1叫1此ti白onhad a position as administrative organization having a kind of 
the power 0ぱfs叩upe臼r泊t旬endencetωo the administrative 0伍ce仇， and used to 
cancel the administrative disposition of transgression， and at the same 
time they thought they themselves could execute their own administra-
tive dispositionin place of this or they. could command the administra縛
tive 0缶ceto execute the definite disposition. However it is a problem 
whether or not the same powers as above-mentioned especially as to 
the judicial law-courts under the New ]apanese Constitution. 
Naturally as to this point， the purport of the constitution acknow-
ledging the power of judgement of the judgement of the judicial law-
courts as to the administrative a妊airsbecomes the gist that the powers 
which had ever belonged to the administrative law-courts are acknow-
dged to belong to the judicial law“courts， and thus the courts executes 
not only cancel1ation of the unlawful dispositionsbut also their own 
determinations in substitution of this， altering the contents of the 
dispositions for themselves， or they can execute the dispositions substi-
tuded for this by their commanding to the administrative 0自ce. There 
are some who hold this point of view... However 1 can't agree to 
this point of view. Even though the judicial law-court comes to have 
the powers of judgement as to the administrative affairs， itdoes not 
mean that the judicial law“court comes to have general power of supe-
rintendence to the power of administration by it's negation of the 
principle of independence of the three powers， or it becomes the socalled 
administrative organization of it's executing the power of administration 
for itself. It has already been mentioned before that the judicial law倫
court as medium of the power of jurisdiction has only.function of the 
limited negative sides of it's securing the concrete application of the 
laws. In this way it should be understood that， besides such a case as 
is prescribed especially in the laws， we can't propose the law-suits asking 
for the new administrative dispositions to the law-court， and that， as to 
the law-suits asking for the alteration or the cancellation of the unlawful 
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administrative dispositions， there being some reasons as to these law-
suits， the partial a1teration and the partial cancellation of the dispositions 
can be only possible. For example， as to the law-suits of objection to 
the refusal of the business licence， there being any reason as to them， 
the law-court can only execute cancellation of the disposition of the 
refusal as it's judgement. And thus it is not admitted for the law-court 
to execute the business licence in place of the administrative 0伍ce，or 
to command the administrative 0日ceto execute the business llcence. 
As to the duty of the law-court of it's securing the application of laws， 
even through it can make judgement whether or not the disposition of 
of the refusal is unlawful， the problem whether or not any concrete 
disposition is executed should be dependent upon the administrative 
o悶cehaving powers to execute such disposition， considering the concrete 
conditions. Thus from the purport of the independence of the three 
powers， this can be said belong to the judgements of the power of 
administration; (See from p. 132 to p. 140， The Power of the Judicial 
Law-court related to the Administrative affairs， in above， The Legal 
Theory of the Administrative Procedure.) 
Moreover from ♂almost the same view-point Prof. OGAWA states 
like the fol1owing: 
“It means that the power of administration is distributed the power 
of execution or non-execution of the administrative act-that the admi-
nistrative act is said to belong to the administrative organization as 
institution. Thus it can be thought that， ifwe acknowledge general1y 
the law-court can command the execution -of its power， we come to 
acknowledge the general superintendence of the law-court by its enter-
ing the power of administration and that finally both the former .and 
the latter end in the same result. 
Namely the substantial meaning of the law lies in it that it gives 
the administrative orgonization the power of the administrative act， 
entrusting the administrative judgements with the matter of determina-
tion whether of not the administratlve organization executes one of the 
administrative act. Thus it should be interpreted that， as a rule， the 
power of jurisdiction investigates the matter whether or not the admini-
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strative judgements are lawful， and that， these judgements being unlaw-
ful， itcan only deny (i.e. cancel) their effect." (See from p. 99 to p. 100， 
The "Administrative procedure ") 
Furthermore， the TAKAMA TSU High Court also says about the 
matter in which it asked the nation for its acknowledgement of the 
certificates of the nationalities of the ships and of the permission of 
fishery-like the following: 
“The law-court can only have the 1imited negative function of its 
securing the concrete application of the laws as medium of the execution 
of the judicial power especially in the adminiftrative a旺airs，and thus 
it does not have such duty as realizes a kind of administrative purpose. 
Therefore， besides the case that there is any special prescription of the 
law， the law時courtcan't make judgements of having the same e妊ectas 
the administrative 0伍cecan give， behaviouring itself in place of the 
latter， and it can't command the latter to execute dispositions. If we 
acknowledge the law-court can have the function of its doing so，自nally
it ends in that the law-court executes the power of administration and 
that it superintend? the administrative 0伍ce，and thus it will become 
contrary to the principle of the independence of the three powers." (See 
p. 1， No. 1， Vol. 4， The Collection of the Judgements and the Judicial 
Precedents of the Administrative A百airs.)
Thus it acknowledges that， from the principle of the independence 
of powers， the supplying judgement can't be recognized as to the admini-
strative law-suits. And the TOKYO High Court states c1early like the 
following especially as to the matter in which it asks the administrative 
o節目 forthe reasons why the latter does not acknowledge the c1aim 
of. the test investigation regarding to the e百ectsof the therapeutics 
and of the medicine， thinking nothing of it-the following is the same 
as the judicial precedents mentioned before-: “This c1aim requires 
the judgement that commands the administrative office to execute the 
administrative act. From the foundation of the independence of the 
three powers in the constitution， however， the law-court does not have 
the power of such judgement as commands the administrative 0伍ceto 
execute the administrative act.' (See p. 1063， No. 5， Vol. 3， The colle-
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ction of the Judgements and the Judicial Precedents of the Administra-
tive Affai1's.) 
Next， the opinion of P1'of. KANEKO has some nuance f1'om these 
disputants， and says that in the chapte1' of the law . aIteration or canω 
cellation of the dispositions... (I mean by it the so-called“alte1'ation 01' 
cancellation oi the dispositions" in the Special Case Law of the p1'ocedure 
of the Administ1'ative matte1's mentioned befo1'e). Howeve1' he1'e isa 
question about what it means. The administ1'ative law-court hitherto 
was in the position of superintendence to the administrative 0伍ce，and 
thus it could cancel the administrative dispositions by reason of its being 
based upon the powe1' of superintendence. 
Thus the cancellation shows that of the manifestation of its original 
intention based upon the powe1' of administration and also means the 
disposition of objection， and the act dependent upon the powe1' of the 
administrative 0缶cehaving the power of cancellation. Then can it be 
possible that such cancellation showing the manifestation of its intention 
will be executed in the law-court based upon the power of jurisdiction? 
F1'om the view point of the foundation of the independence of the 
three powers， the law-court can't execute the power of administ1'ation 
fo1' itself. Therefo1'e the cancellation of the law-court does not show 
the manifestation of its intention， but 1'athe1' shows only that， as the 
result of the establishment of t1'ansgression by the judgement， its own 
act of excution can be cancelled and also the possibility of the application 
of laws to the administ1'ative dispositions can be turned over. Thus it 
is possible to think that this is a special effect caused by the manife-
station of the judgement of the law-court as well as the power of fo1'-
mation and of the execution of its judgement. What the law伶cou1'tcan 
act lies only in the manifestation of the judgement based upon the 
complete application of the laws. Howeve1'， if the content of the judge-
ment is that needing the powe1' of execution， 01' the powe1' of execution 
is the content of the judgement needing the powe1' of formation， itis 
likewise thinkable that the power of fo1'mation can be given to it as 
judgement of fo1'mation. In this way of 1'ecognigation it can be possible 
that the power of jurisdiction is accused of its execution of the powe1' 
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of administration. Thus it seems that the judgement of the cancellation 
of the administrative disposition can't say the proc1amation of the 
temporary execution. 
As for the law-court， itcan only execute the cancellation in that 
sense， but can't execute the disposition in place of the administrative 
o自ce. For example， as to the unsatisfied law-suits to the dispositions 
in which the c1aim of acknowledgement is rejected， ifthere is any 
lawful reason to them， the law-court should execute the cancellation of 
the disposition of refusal， and thus it is a kind of excessive act for the 
judge to acknowledge it by himself or to command the office of defen-
dants to acknowledge it. The law-court execute only the cancellation 
and it entrusts the other matters only to the administrative 0伍ce.
As to the case of its cancelling the petitioned judgement， the lawω 
court only draws back to the conditions in which there has never been 
the judgement of the law-court， and thus it can't give its own judgement 
Thus， even if there is“the alteration or cancellation of the administ-
rative dispositions" in the chapter of the law， the so勝calledalteration is 
not the new disposition， but it seems to mean the partial cancellation 
of them. The power of jurisdiction can't substitute for another disposiゅ
tion by its having cancelled some parts of them as transgression" (See 
p. 18， No. 7， Vol. 2， The Law Times the Quality of the Administrative 
Cases) Thus it is considered that the supplying judgement in the 
administrative procedure escapes from the 1imitation of the power of 
jurisdiction. Further the KANAZA W A District Court states like the 
following-as to the law-suits asking for the fulglment of the duty of 
calling the cityassembly-from the same view-point: 
“The matter as to whether or not the power of administration can 
be generally executed， or how it can be really executed is the item 
entrusted only to the administrative organization. The law-court only 
execustes the judgement of the concrete application of laws from the 
view-point of the foundation of the function securing the judicial laws， 
and only establish the c1aim relation in the public law or the matter as 
to whether the administrative disposition is lawful or not. Namely it 
must be said that it is not admitted as transgression of the limitation 
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of the power of jurisdiction for the law-court to command the omission 
of the administrative 0缶ceto ，execute the dispositions positively， and 
to cancel the performed administrative dispositions， and to command 
the administrative 0伍ceto execute the administrative dispositions， beha帥
viouring itself in place of the administrative 0伍ce." (See p. 37， No. 1， 
Vol. 1， The Collection of the Judicial Precedents of the Administrative 
Affairs) And thus， saying in that way， itrefused this. 
Furthermore， even though the view-points or Prof. TAGAMI is 
very different from the above mentioned theories， having considerably 
some peculiarity， itcan be said to take even the sides of thus kind. 
Namely he insists upon the following: 
“It is of course certain for the law-court not to be able to execute 
the power of administration， but it can't be said that so long as there 
is need to protect the c1aim of the plaintiff in the concrete affairs， the 
supplying judgement by the law-court as to the administrative dispositi輔
ons does not always escape the limitation of the power of jurisdiction" 
He continues to state: 
“If the administrative 0伍cedoes not have any free ability as to 
the administrative dispositions， in another words， the execution of the 
dispositions being obliged to by the laws， itcan propose the supplying 
law-suit enforcing to execute the disposition to the act of unfulfilment 
of duty just as in the private law relations， and thus the law-suit of 
acknowledging that it has duty to execute the dispositions should be 
permitted. "耳esays，“Then， isthere any case in which there is no 
room for the power of concideration the administrative 0伍ceas to its 
disposition ?" He replies like the following: 
“First， even if the law establishes the one-sided prescriptions as to 
the matters of the administrative dispositions， there is some room for 
consideration as to the acknowledgement of the facts to be concerned 
to it， and thus， ifthe administrative disposition is only the simple act 
of the execution of laws without any consideration accompanied， itcan 
be thinkable that the effect of the law does not need the disposition， 
being directly based upon the law. Thus we can say that al of the 
administrative dispositions make up for the laws and therefore they 
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become the concrete laws.一・.Second，the dispositions belonging to the 
consideration of laws by the administrative office are di妊erentfrom the 
those of free consideration， and the errors of the considerations submit 
to the judicial investigation， and thus the self緋independenceof the admi-
nistrative of五ceis not acknowledged. However after the execution of 
the power of consideration by the administrative 0缶cereceives possi-
bility of the lawfulness especially in the law-court， even though the 
content of the disposition determined by the administrative 0缶ceis taken 
up in the matter of law-suit， itdoes not always arrive the same conclu-
sion as in the case in which the law-court determines the content of 
the disposition， preceding that by the administrative 0伍ce.
In this way here is need that the initiative of the administrative 
o伍ceshould be respected as to the disposition in the consideration of 
laws. It is contrary to the independence of the powers to propose the 
supplying law-suits in execution of such disposition." (See from p. 104 
to p. 106， No. 8， The Study of the Public Law， The Independence of the 
Administrative Power to the Jud出icialPowe町r二.
In this way 1 have mentioned the g訂is坑t0ぱfthe academiたct白heo仇n詑esond
Oぱfthe judicial pre配ci凶den批1式t，al of which generally insist upon inability of 
acknowledging the supplying judgements as to the administrative law-
suits， insisting upon the transgressiveness to the principle of the inde-
pendence of the powers in case that the supplying judgement is permi-
tted. Therefore what these disputants insist upon， in a word， lies in 
the points， that the administrative law-court in the Old Japanese Imperial 
Constitution could execute the supplying judgement because it had had 
the power of superintendence as a kind of administrative organization to 
the administrative 0伍ce，and that， ifthe judicial law-court nowadays 
having not such power executes the supplying judgements as to the 
administrative a旺airs，it means that the law-court as judicial organization 
executes the act of administration， and that therefore. the power of 
jurisdiction originally to be equally independent of one another infringes 
the power of administration. Then can the contentions of these dispu-
tants be justi五ed? Since， atleast， 1 think there are considerably pro-
blems as to it， 1 should like to investigate what they insist up 
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in detail. First the disputants say that the supplying judgements were 
acknowledged as to the administrative law-suits especially in the Old 
Japanese Imperial Constitution because the admistrative law-court as a 
kind of administrative organization had the power of superintendence 
to the administrative 0伍ce，executing the judgement and the detailed 
investigation as to the adminstrative affairs. Certainly the administrative 
law-court that had executed the judegements and the detailed investigaω 
tions-under the Old Japanese Constitution， just as the disputants insist 
upon， was kind of the administrative organization. However can it be 
conc1uded that in that way the administrative law-court had been given 
the power of superintendence to the administrative office? On this 
point' the disputants only explain that the administrative law-court as a 
kind of administrative organization had the power of superintendence， 
but they do not explain any .more as to what law they rely upon， and 
moreover what kind of content was given to the power of superinten-
dence. 
Thus we can't but inferring this from what they insist upon， but 
since generally there are only two kinds of the powers of superinten-
dence i. e. the general power of superintendence and the special power 
of it， atleast， itmust mean either the former or the latter. On the 
one hand， the general power of superintendence (we mean generally 
the superintendenceas power of the administrative 0伍ecby this kind 
of superintendence) means that it belongs to the same administrative 
system and thus it is executed between the higher administrative office 
and the lower one， both of which have the same common administrative 
business. On the other hand， even if the administrative law-court is 
said to be the administrative organization， itis c1ear that the judgements 
of the administrative a旺airsexecuted only at the administrative law-court 
did not belong to the judicial idea limited to the judgements of the civil 
or criminal a茸airsat those days， namely it was formally the adminis-
trative organization， and thus what it executed was thoroughly limited to 
the judgements of the administrative affairs， and so it was not the 
administration in the true original meaning， i.e. the action that the 
nation will realize the conditions of reality so as to accomplish its pur-
THE SKPPLYING JUDGEMENT IN THE 
ADMINISTRA TIVE PROCEDURE 
47 
pose. Therefore it was completely the special power of administrative 
organization that executes only the judgements and the investigations of 
the administrative affairs， and thus it does not belong to the same 
administrative system as al of the other administrative organs (i. e. the 
organizations that execute the original true administrations except the 
administrative law-courts) do， and it also does not have the same common 
administrative business， and thus it can't be possible that the general 
power of superintendence was given to the administrative law-court. 
However， since the relation of the general superintendence can be main-
tained only among the same administrative c1ass， such kind of relation 
can be established between the administrative law-court and the other 
adminitrative 0缶ce. Then is it be possible to think that the power of 
superintendence which the disputants think to have been given to the 
administrative lawωcourt means the special power of superintendence? 
Surely the special superintendence means that some definite adminis倫
trative 0伍cesexcept the administrative c1ass execute to al of the other 
administrative 0伍cesespecially from some special points. 
For example， they are the superintendence of accountancy by the 
section of accountany investigation， and the superintendence of personal 
administration by the bureau of personal administration， etc. 
Since the administrative law“court was given the power of cancelling 
or altering the dispositions executed by the other administrative 0缶ces
and of commanding them to execute some definite actions， itseemed 
from the outsid that the administrative law~court would be given the 
special power of superintendence to theother adiministrative 0田ces.
(according to my inference， itis possible that what the disputants-
though they said that the administrative law-court was kind of power of 
superintendence -means this kind of superintendence). 
However the socalled時relationof superintendence among the admini司
strative offices can't be real until it is based upon the law. 
Namely， since the adminitrative office can represent the nation only 
within the limitation acknowledged by the laws， executing its power， it
is impossible that some administrative 0伍cescan natural1y execute the 
power of superintendence to the other ones， and thus even if they do 
48 jUNKtCHI MATSUSHIMA 
so， there will be surely any c1ear or suggestive prescription regarding it. 
Hower， as to the matter whether or not there was such prescription in 
the administrative law-court， the prescription of the law prescribes only 
that the administrative law-court can execute the judgements and the 
investigations as to the administrative a百airs. Therefore， so long as 
we do not look on the power of administrative judgement as the so-called 
power of administrative superintendence， the administrative law-court 
is not given the power of superintendence to the other administrative 
o伍ces，so think 1. But if it is true so， itcan be said that it was finally 
based upon the power of adminitrative judgement i. e. the power of 
administrative superintendence that the administrative law-court under 
the OId ]apanese Constitution could execute the supplying judgements， 
and thus there will be no room for birth of doubt especially as to this 
point， even though the judicial law-courts nowadays having the power 
of administrative judgement execute the supplying judgements. At the 
same time， suppose that we insist thoroughly upon the contentions of 
the disputants who think the administrative law-court was given the 
power of superintendence to the other administrative 0缶ces，the admi-
nistrative lawωcourt as the natural action of the so拘calledpower of superin明
tendence， can willingly execute the judgements and the investigation of 
the administrative dispositions without its waiting for the c1aim from 
the disposed people， and thus it is possible that it can execute the 
judgements not only of the unlawful dispositions but also of the improper 
ones. Therefore here is a great contradiction between this and the 
really given power of the administrative law-court. Second， ifnowadays 
the disputants acknowledge the supplying judgements in the adminis-
trative law-suits， itis said that the judicial court comes to execute the 
administrative action and thus the administrative power comes to be 
inbringed by the judicial power to be equally independent of each other. 
But in that case， there no agreement among the disputants especially 
as to the mattersof the reason why the supplying judgement become 
the administrative actions or of how the judicial power inbringes the 
administrative power， and thus their contentions are very various， so 
we can't a伍rmthis completely frum one-side. It seems there are con-
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ln the most representative and standard theory as to it， the action 
of judgement as the essence of jurisdiction is regarded as the represen-
tation (1aw-abiding commission) of the idea， and the supplying judgement 
is finally the representation (1awful commission) of the wi1 commanding 
some definite commission or omission to the administrative 0伍ce，and 
thus it is said not to be permitted owing to the reason that it escapes 
from the region of the jurisdictional power. 
lndeed， the action of jurisdiction， as the disputant asserts， isthe 
representation of judgement. But it is rather a hasty judgement to deny 
the supplying judgement as to the administrative law-suits only direct1y 
from it. Namely， suppose that the law“courts can't do anything but 
represent the judgements， the judgement of concellation should be re-
mained in acknowledging the unlawfulness of the adminstrative dispo・
sitions giving rise to it. However， why is such formal power as extin-
guishes the administrative dispositions as to the judgement of cancellation 
produced? The disputant explains as to this point that it is a special 
effect given especially by the laws. But， as to the representation of the 
idea as the law-abiding commission， the laws generally let the judicial 
effects adhere to the men of commission， even though they do not want 
them. Thus it can surely be thought that， as to the acknowledgement 
of the. c1aim power of supplement asserted by the plaintiff， the e百ects
of the supplying command by the plainti百areadded to. 
lndeed， the fact that the supplying judgement can be admitted in 
the civi1 law引1itsmay be interpreted into saying that such effects are 
given by the laws. Moreover， even thought we suppose that the law-
courts can't do anything but represent the idea about it， itcan't be said 
that the action of jurisdiction escapes from its region by this so long as 
the supplying judgements are regarded as the acknowledgement of the 
c1ain power of the supplement asserted by the plainti百.
Next from the view-point of the traditional situation which distin岨
guishes administration from juridiction as to the purpose of the actions 
performed， itis asserted that the supplying judgements are the actions 
commanding some definite commissions or omission to the administra-
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tive 0缶ceand thus they are the actions intending the realization of 
sorne results and thus they are neither the so-called judicial actions 
depending on the adrninistrative action， nor， the actions of rnaintaning 
the laws. 
Indeed， the purpose of the judicial actions is di旺erentfrorn that of 
the adrninistrative action， thus frorn this point the both two are distin-
guished frorn each other. Narnely， the purpose of the judical laws lies 
in the rnaintenance of the order of laws and also are the actions in which 
they proc1airn as to the concrete facts， but the adrninistration is the action 
represented so as to realize the real circurnstances in accornplishing the 
national airns. However， which side does it belong to， i.e. the action 
that the law-court fils the supplying judgernents? 
Not to rnention， the supplying judgernent in the adrninistral law-suits 
is the action asking for sorne definite cornrnissions or ornissions against 
the adrninistrative 0缶ce. Thus， this kind of actions cornrnanding to the 
lower adrninistrative 0缶ces，depending on the superintendence， car1 be 
identified with the forrn of their actions， therefore at a glance it seerns 
as if the adrninistrative actions. But the both two are di百erenteach 
other in the purposes of their actions， -frorn this point， as rnentioned 
before， the distinction of the jurisdiction and the adrninistration can be 
practised -and thus it can be tought that the cornrnand of sorne definite 
cornrnissions or ornissions to the adrninistrative 0田ceas to the supplying 
judgernent by the law-courts can be executed as proc1arnation to be applied 
in the case frorn the view point of the rnaintenance of our laws. And 
here in the other theory， even in the case in which the business of the 
adrninistrative dispositions is uniquely deterrnined by the laws， there is 
acknowledged sorne roorn of consideration in the acknowledgernent of 
the facts in it. Thus it can be said that it is not perrnitted for the 
law-court to execute the supplying judgernent， going before the adrninis-
trative dispositions， owing to the reason that it is equal for this to deprive 
of the initative given to the adrninistrative 0缶ce. However， itreally 
shows that such dispositions are the ones of suprernacy that the laws 
prescribe the business of the adrninistrative dispositions in the unique 
rnanner. Thus it would be suggested that there is no rnore roorn for 
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Furthermore， even in the case that the laws prescribe the business 
of the administrative dispositions in the unique manner， there being stil 
some room for consideration by the administrative 0缶ce，such disposi司
tions become the ones of free consideration. Finally it would resul that 
both the supplying judgement and the judgement of cancellation can't 
be permitted. ln spite of this， what is the reason why the supplying 
judgement can't be permitted， even though only the judgement of can-
cellation is permitted ?There are considerably some problems 9n this 
point. 
(I) The other points except these becoming the foundation of argument， 
however， there are not few theories and judicial precedents denying the 
supplying judgements in the administrative law引lIts. First， as a general 
principle of our existing law， there being not given to the nation the 
c1aim power of supplement against the administrative 0伍ce，it is asse-
rted that the law-court can't execute the judgements commanding some 
definite commissions or omissions against the administrative 0伍ce. For 
example， the judge ASAGA states that， 'only in such a case that it is 
understood that it is advantageous direct1y for some definite nation to 
execute the administrative dispositions in accordance with the judicial 
prescription， the nation can propose the appeal of the supplement against 
the administrative 0伍ce，" and that “as a rule， there being not given to 
the side of the nation such a c1aim power in accordance with the written 
laws， the supplying judgement as to the general administrative law-suits 
finally can't be permitted' (Some Problems of The Administrative Pro-
ccdure ASAGA， p.37-p. 38). 
lndeed， in the public law a百airs，just as the disputant asserts， the 
advantage to be received by the nation becoming not yet the so-called 
public power， thus there are many bases in which it is nothing but refle-
ction of the laws. On the other hand， however， there are many cases in 
which the nation is given the power againts the administrative 0缶ce.
For example， itis stated c1eary in the Artic1e 10， 11 and 12 and in the 
Artic1e 69 etc. in the Life Protection Law -that it is the right that the 
very nation receives their advantages. Therefore， in such a case， there 
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will be no reason to regard the advantages to be received as re丑ection
of laws. So long as it is the right， itshould be interpreted that it is 
possible to c1aim the advantages to be received by the nation against 
the administrative 0伍ceto be concerned with. As to this point， it
seems true that the disputant think that， the c1aim power of supplement 
of the nation being abstract， not concrete， the law-suits c1aiming some 
definite supplement against the administrative 0伍ceare not permitted. 
Even if it is regarded in such a way， in the case that the appeal 
aboutよheinfringement of the powers by the unlawful administrative 
dispositions is proposed， itseems that this appeal becomes the law-suits 
as to the concrete rights and duties. 
(II) Furthermore， there are another disputants who assert that， there 
being generally not the institution of the dutyexecution command espe-
cially in ]apan， the law-courts can't execute such supplying judgement 
as commanding some de自nitecommissions or omissions against the ad-
ministrative 0伍ce. For example， as to the law-suit of calling the asse喝
mbly， the Kanazawa locallaw-court states c1early that， the so-called duty 
execution command as general institution being not admitted in ]apan， 
so long as there is no special prescription about that， itmust be said 
that the law-court does not have power commanding the action of calling 
the assembly to the head of the city as administrative organ". (See p. 
101， No. 1， succession， The collection of the ]udical Precedents of the 
Administrative A百airs.) However， the appeal asking for the duty execu-
tion command being a speciallaw-suit regarded as formal administrative 
law引lIt，it can be said that it is a complete reverse order to make 
judgements of analogical inference as to the principal law-suits -from 
thes exceptional kind of law引lIts.
(3) 
Next， 1 should like to make a survey of the assertions of the theorセs
and the judicial precedents， admitting the supplying judgements os to 
the administrative law引 lits. Even among the disputants who stand on 
this kind of position， itis fact that there is considerably difference of 
nuance in their assertions. The most typical and representative theory 
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arnong thern. is that of Pr・ofessorY AMADA's. Professor YAMADA 
asserte like the following: “Frorn the view point of the contents of the 
adrninistrative affairs， the exarnination of thern is indeed adrninistration， 
but it becornes jurisdiction frorn the view point of their forrnal a百airs.
The problern， therefore， whether it is entrusted to the adrninistrative 
organ or to the judicial organ， isdi百erentarnong the nations， and thus 
there is not always uniforrnity about it. ln Japan， however， the power 
of judgernent as to the adrninistrative a百airsbeing given to the general 
law-courts as judicial organ， even if the law-court cornrnandsasorne defi-
nite cornrnissions or ornissions against the adrninitrative 0岳ce，it does 
not transgress the principle of the independence of power any rnore， so 
long as it is regarded as judicial judgernent. Moreover， the ornission 
of the transgression of duties being possible to be regarded as a kind 
of action， itshould be understood that， even in such a case， the propo-
sition can be adrnitted. Therefore， in the case that the nation su在ers
infringernent of the powers in a unlawful rnanner， without any relation 
to the rnatter of the adrninist(ative dispositions， itcan ask the law-court 
for the supplying judgernent." (See frorn p. 1妊， vol. 29， N.o 2/3， 4/5 
the Meiji Law Review， as to the adoption in Japan of the west-gerrnan 
suits for agency action).ω 
lndeed it is understood that it transgress the principle of the inde-
pendence of powers acknowledging the initiative of the adrninistrative 
dispositions against the adrninistrative 0伍ce--toperrnit the supplying 
judgernent as to the adrninistrative law-suits. As to this point， the dis-
putant rneans that the ornission of the transgression of duties can be 
regarded as a kind of action， but it seerns that there is considerably 
problerns owing to the reason that， inJapan， the Arnerican-English way 
of thinking of laws has not been rnatured yet. 
(4) 
Finally 1 rnean to state rny own conc1usion as to this problern. 
First， when one books at the Japanese Constitution， itprescribes 
(1) The following can be taken up as of the same viewpoint as the above-mentioned 
theories: Decision at the sapporo high court: November 8. 24 of showa. (p. 63 f. vol. 
17， col1ection of the judicial precedent of the administrative affairs.) 
54 ]UNKICHI MATSUSHIMA 
fundamental principles of the national system in the item of the parlia-
ment of the chapter 4， and in the item of the Cabinet of the chapter 
5， and in the Artic1e 3 of the ]urisdiction of the chapter 6. And in 
each top of the chapter the following prescriptions are prescribed:“The 
Diet shal1 be the highest organ of state power， and shall be the sole 
lawmaking organ of the state" (Artic1e 41)， and Executive power shall 
be vested in the Cabinet" (Artic1e 65)， and “.The whole judical power is 
vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as are established 
by law. No extraoadinary tribunal shall be established， nor shall any 
organ or agency of the Executive be given fianl judical power." (Item 1 
and 2 in Artic1e 76). Thus， naturally from these prescriptions， itcan easily 
be understood that， the principle of the independence of powers beign 
adopted in the Constitution of ]apan its contents are divided into the three 
actions， i.e. legislation 3nd administration and jurisdiction， and these act-
ions belong one another to the Legislative Organ (i.e. par1iament) and to 
the Administrative Organ (i.e. Cabinet) and to the ]urisdictional Organ 
(i.e. Law-Court). If the national action executing the supplying judgements 
as to the administrative law-suits is executed as jurisciictional action， 
naturally the law町courtcan execute it owing to the reason that such an 
action should be executed as a rule by the judicial organ. However， can 
it be thought that such an action is a jurisdictional action? It has been 
said that it is very di伍cultto distinguish the jurisdictional action from 
the administrative action especially from the quality of their actions， 
because the both two have been the actions of the execution or applica-
tion of laws. However， just as many disputants recently point out， from 
the view point of the purpose of the both two to be executed， even if 
they are said equally to be the actions of application of laws， the former 
is the action executed for giving rise to the circumstances of really so 
as to accomylish the national purpose and the latter is the action procIai-
ming the laws to be applied in comformity to the concrete facts， and thus 
the difference between the both two lies in this point. Therefore we 
can easily understand that the distinction between the both two can be 
performed. On the other hand， as to the action executing the supplping 
judgements in the administrative law-suits， this kind of action b 
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based only upon the judicial value judgement， itapplies the prescriptions 
to the concrete disputes， and thus it only proc1aims what the prescript-
ions command， acknowledging that the plainti百 hasthe judicial c1aim 
power of the supplement. Namely， itis surely executed as the proc1a-
mation of laws to be applied to the actions so as to maintain the laws， 
and it is never executed towards the direction giving rise to the circu-
mstances of reality to accomplish the national purpose. Therefore， it
can be conc1uded c1early that the action of executing the supplying 
judgements as to the administrative affairs is surely the jurisdictional 
action， not the administrative one. 
Next， while we look at the Special Precedents Law as to the Iaw-
suits of the administrative a旺airsas the Special Law as to the admini町
strative law時suits，it uses such a sentence as ‘the cancellation or alte-
ration of the administrative law-suits' in the Artic1e 1 and 2 in the 
above-mentioned law. In this case， ifwe realize the word 'alteration' 
literally， 1 think that it is the purport of the law that the law-court is 
permitted to execute both cancellation of the administrative dispositions 
and alterations of their contents. Furthermore it can be possibly con-
c1uded that， if it is in that way， the law-court can execute some 
dispositions to be substituted for cancelling the administrative disposit-
ions executed already， and that the law-court can be admitted to com-
mand the execution about this to the administrative 0缶ce.
From these reasons mentioned above， 1 wish to mean that the man 
who is entrusted the right to the unlawfulness by the administrative 
disposition can ask the law-court for the supplying judgement. (1) 
(1) See the foolowing work as of the same view as mine. T. Isozaki， p.1 f. vol. 11， 
No. 2， The Pub1ic Law Review， The ]ugement of the Court affecting an Unlawful act. 
